Oh, Go Away

Experts I spoke to also noted that removing bad actors from a platform can help prevent users who aren’t yet down the rabbit hole from being radicalized.

“We need to protect those normies, the normal users who don’t want to be radicalized into neo-nazism or whatever it may be. We need to protect them from being harassed and recruited,” said Megan Squire, a computer science professor at Elon University who studies online extremism.
Kaleigh Rogers "What Kicking Trump Off Twitter Can — And Can’t — Do" FiveThirtyEight

Okay, I'm going to admit to being dubious about the idea that anyone who can't manage to protect themselves from unwillingly being radicalized into neo-Nazism has any business being on the Internet at all, let alone social media. Then again, I'm not 100% certain that they should be allowed out of the house, either.

But the whole idea of making the social media platforms safe from harassment and recruiting is that it's not going to be a blanket policy. And that raises the thorny question of who decides. It's easy to call out neo-Nazis. They're everyone's favorite whipping boys, precisely because they're considered morally unambiguous villains by nearly everyone who isn't themselves a neo-Nazi. The fact that it's considered somewhere between gauche and sacrilegious to defend them allows for calls to censor them (or have them shot, for that matter) to be easily rolled out without fear of pushback. But as with any low-hanging fruit, it conveniently leaves the difficult work for later.

Should, for instance, people who grew up atheist be allowed to call for the deplatforming of adherents of proselytizing religions? After all, it's not as if there is some magical force that disallows the religious from harassing and recruiting others who might at first find their attentions unwanted. And there are religious communities who argue that they should have a right to be free from missionaries spreading their messages among them, something that missionary groups say would be an unacceptable infringement on their freedom of religion.

The question regarding the freedom of proselytism, however, is still unsettled. This question, as elaborated above, involves two distinct freedoms: the freedom of the proselytizer to conduct proselytizing activities (the "positive" sense of freedom) and the freedom of the potential convert/proselyte not to be interfered in his faith by proselytizing activities (the "negative" sense of freedom).
Moshe Hirsch, The Freedom of Proselytism Under the Fundamental Agreement and International Law, 47 Cath. U. L. Rev. 407 (1998).

And sure, one could make the point that there is a fundamental difference between a neo-Nazi and an annoying Evangelical Christian. But what really matters in this context is the fact that fear of being lead into conversion to Christianity is considered too trivial to be taken seriously, while neo-Nazis are considered too dangerous to be allowed to speak to anyone. But these sorts of social agreements can change, and quickly. While neo-Nazis are likely to be consigned to the wilderness for just about any value of the foreseeable future, I don't know if it's wise for other groups to presume that they won't also find themselves there.